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1 Introduction 
Estimates of the social cost of carbon (dioxide emissions), or the marginal damage cost 
of climate change are an essential ingredient to any assessment of climate policy. The 
social cost of carbon (SCC) is a first estimate of the Pigou tax that should be placed on 
carbon dioxide emissions. Indeed, if the SCC is computed along a trajectory in which 
the marginal costs of emission reduction equal the SCC, the SCC is the Pigou tax. Few 
would argue that climate policy should be set by cost-benefit analysis alone, but most 
economists would feel queasy if climate policy would drift too far from its optimum—
although analysts in other disciplines are less compelled by the branch of utilitarianism 
that is common in economics. This paper presents a meta-analysis of over 200 estimates 
of the SCC, and tests three hypotheses: 
• The Stern Review is an outlier in the literature (Tol 2006). 
• The economic estimates of the impact of climate change increase over time 
(Schneider et al. 2007). 
• The uncertainty about the social cost of carbon has a fat right tail (Weitzman 2007b). 
In Tol (2005), I also presented a meta-analysis of the SCC. There are four reasons 
for the current update. Firstly, the number of estimates has roughly doubled. Tol (2005) 
was part of a larger study that led to many new estimates, but other studies were 
published as well—and my attention was drawn to a handful of estimates I had 
previously overlooked. See Table A1 for the full list of estimates.1 Secondly, the Stern 
Review (Stern et al. 2006) was published, provoking renewed interest in cost-benefit 
analyses of climate policy (Anderson 2007; Byatt et al. 2006; Carter et al. 2006; 
Dasgupta 2007; Dietz et al. 2007a, b; Hamid et al. 2007; Mendelsohn 2006; Nordhaus 
2007a, b; Spash 2007; Stern and Taylor 2007; Tol 2006; Tol and Yohe 2006, 2007a; 
Yohe 2006; Yohe and Tol 2006; Yohe et al. 2007; note that these are the published 
papers only—various journals are preparing special issues). The Stern Review also 
published an estimate of the SCC. Although many newspapers publicised the Stern 
Review as entirely novel, its estimate is in fact number 211 in chronological order. A 
number of people argued that the Stern Review is an outlier. This paper formally tests 
this assertion. Thirdly, the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was published (Schneider et al. 2007). It argues that 
economic estimates of the impact of climate change have become more pessimistic 
since the previous report of 2001. This paper formally tests this assertion as well. 
Fourthly, Weitzman (2007b) argues that climate economics has unduly focussed on the 
middle of the probability distribution, and should have focussed on the tails. This paper 
supports that argument. Fourthly, I estimate the risk premium and the fraction of people 
that would be able to afford the estimated carbon tax. 
Although there are now over 200 estimates of the SCC, research in this area is still 
less developed than one would wish. The 200 estimates of the marginal costs of climate 
change are based on a dozen of estimates of the total costs of climate change (Cline 
1992; Fankhauser 1995; Maddison 2003; Mendelsohn et al. 2000; Nordhaus 1991, 
_________________________ 
1 Note that most studies do not specify the year for which the estimate is valid. As rough indication, one 
can work with the assumption that the social cost of carbon is expressed in US dollars of around 1995, 
and hold for emissions around the year 2000. 
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1994, 2006; Nordhaus and Boyer 2000; Nordhaus and Yang 1996; Rehdanz and 
Maddison 2005; Tol 1995, 2002).2 The total cost estimates omit some impacts of 
climate change; they tend to ignore interactions between different impacts, and neglect 
higher order effects on the economy and population; they rely on extrapolation from a 
few detailed case studies; they often impose a changing climate on a static society; they 
use simplistic models of adaptation to climate change; they often ignore uncertainties; 
and they use controversial valuation methods and benefit transfers. 
Unfortunately, this list of caveats3 has not changed much since Fankhauser and Tol 
(1996). The proximate reason is that few people work in this area, and none full time, as 
funding is difficult to get. The ultimate reasons are, firstly, that the issues are complex 
and uncertain, and require broad multidisciplinary knowledge and, secondly, that the 
results are unpopular with climate policy makers. 
However, climate change is climbing the international policy agenda again—and 
certain countries do require a cost-benefit analysis on any major policy decision. Some 
countries prefer to cook the books rather than do serious analysis (e.g., Clarkson and 
Deyes 2002; Pearce 2003; CEC 2005a, b; Tol 2007), but other countries try to use the 
best available knowledge. In this paper, I present that—but the reader should be aware 
that “best available” does not mean “good” in this case. 
In Section 2, I present the data and methods. Section 3 shows the results for the 
monetary estimates, while Section 4 estimates the risk premium and distributional 
implications. Section 5 concludes. 
2 Data and Methods 
211 estimates of the SCC were gathered from 47 studies.4 See Table A1. The estimates 
are for different years, but most roughly represent the marginal damage costs for 
emissions in the year 1995, discounted to 1995, and measured in 1995 US dollars. The 
studies were grouped in those that were peer-reviewed and those that were not (PR in 
Table A1). Note that some of the more recent studies are currently under peer-review, 
but they are counted as gray literature until published. Some studies are based on 
original estimates of the total costs of climate change, while other studies borrow total 
costs estimates from other studies (IE in Table A1). Most studies use incremental or 
marginal calculus to estimate the SCC, as they should, while a few others use average 
impacts or an unspecified method (ME in Table 1). Some studies assume that climate 
changes but society does not (i.e., all income elasticities are zero), while other studies 
include a dynamic model of vulnerability (DM in Table A1). A few studies use entirely  
_________________________ 
2 Note that Nordhaus and Mendelsohn are colleagues; that Fankhauser, Maddison and Tol worked with 
David Pearce and each other in the formative stages of their careers; and that Rehdanz used to be a PhD 
student of Maddison and Tol. 
3 Some people would argue that climate change is not a marginal change, and that therefore the marginal 
damage costs of carbon dioxide emissions are an inappropriate measure. This reasoning is incorrect, as 
any emission reduction has a only a small effect on climate change. The social cost of carbon should be 
used to inform emission reduction. 
4 Most of the estimates of the SCC are along a business as usual scenario of greenhouse gas emissions, 
but some are along a path of optimal control. Two estimates of the SCC by Stern et al. (2006) were 
omitted because they are along a path of arbitrary emission reduction. 
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Table 1: Selected Characteristicsa of the Joint Probability Density of the Social Cost of 
Carbon for the Whole Sample (all) and Selected Subsamplesb 
 All PRTP Review Publication date 
  0% 1% 3% peer gray <1996 1996–
2001 
>2001 
Fisher-Tippett, sample standard deviation 
Mode 35 129 56 14 20 53 36 37 27 
Mean 127 317 80 24 71 196 190 120 88 
St.Dev. 243 301 70 21 98 345 392 179 121 
Median 74 265 72 21 48 106 88 75 62 
90% 267 722 171 51 170 470 397 274 196 
95% 453 856 204 61 231 820 1,555 482 263 
99% 1,655 1,152 276 82 524 1,771 1,826 867 627 
Stern 0.92 0.56 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.84 0.86 0.92 0.96 
Gauss, sample standard deviation 
Mode 33 136 46 14 21 46 32 35 29 
Mean 88 220 55 16 49 135 131 83 61 
St.Dev. 243 298 70 21 98 345 392 178 121 
Median 47 194 53 16 33 65 49 50 42 
90% 213 626 146 44 142 350 298 221 164 
95% 371 747 172 52 201 766 1,453 428 219 
99% 1,623 953 221 67 503 1,734 1,782 843 610 
Stern 0.94 0.65 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.89 0.91 0.94 0.97 
Gauss, sample coefficient of variation 
Mode 0 19 5 2 3 0 4 5 0 
Mean 102 225 55 16 55 144 125 100 68 
St.Dev. 351 342 69 20 186 437 424 323 223 
Median 15 107 34 10 14 18 14 16 17 
90% 304 676 151 43 159 407 360 264 210 
95% 596 989 195 58 310 891 808 537 361 
99% 2,025 1,502 285 89 885 2,420 2,411 1,841 1,127 
Stern 0.90 0.76 0.99 1.00 0.95 0.87 0.89 0.92 0.94 
aMode, mean, standard deviation, median, 90-percentile, 95-percentile, 99-percentile, 
percentile of the Stern estimate. bPure rate of time preference, review process, and 
publication date. 
arbitrary assumptions about future climate change, while most studies are based on 
internally consistent scenarios (SC in Table A1). These classifications are used as 
quality indicators.5 Specifically, the sum of the values in Table A1 is the “quality” of 
the study. More recent studies receive a higher weight—publication year minus 1980 
over 10—so that age contributes up to one-third of the total quality weight. Many of the 
studies report multiple estimates. Most of the estimates are sensitivity analyses around a 
central estimate, and some estimates are only included to (approximately) reproduce an 
earlier study. The quality weight of a study is distributed over the alternative estimates 
in that study on the basis of my assessment of what the author thinks are more and less 
_________________________ 
5 Note that the five quality indicators are objective. The aggregation is arbitrary. 
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credible assumptions. Tol (2005) reports a sensitivity analysis, and finds that the results 
are robust. 
The 211 estimates are classified as follows. Most estimates use the Ramsey discount 
rule—δ = ρ + ηg—but some estimates use a constant consumption discount rate rather 
than a constant utility discount rate. A few recent studies use a declining discount rate 
(inspired by Gollier 2002, and Weitzman 2001), a few studies fail to report what 
discount rate was used, and a few studies include the discount rate in the uncertainty 
analysis. Some studies use equity weighting (Fankhauser et al. 1997) with the global 
average income as normalisation (Anthoff et al., forthcoming), but most studies simply 
add the regional dollar values (for which normalisation is irrelevant; cf. Fankhauser 
et al. 1998). The discount rate and the age of the study are used to split the sample. 
I adjust three alternative kernel density estimators to these data points. Essentially, a 
kernel density estimator assigns a probability density function to each data point, and 
the kernel estimator is the weighted sum of these PDFs. As always, the standard choice 
is the Gaussian distribution. The 211 estimates provide the modes. Only a few of the 
studies provide an estimate of the uncertainty. Therefore, either the standard deviation 
or the coefficient of variation is set equal to the sample standard deviation or the sample 
coefficient of variation. However, the uncertainty in the sample is right-skewed and fat-
tailed. Therefore, the Fisher-Tippett distribution is also used, with the modes equal to 
the best guesses and the standard deviations equal to the sample standard deviation. The 
coefficient of variation of the Fisher-Tippett distributed is bounded from above at about 
1.7, which is smaller than the sample coefficient variation. However, the Fisher-Tippett 
distribution is the only distribution that is right-skewed, fat-tailed, and defined on the 
entire real line. 
3 Results 
Table 1 shows selected characteristics of the kernel distributions for the whole sample 
and selected sub-samples. Figure 1 shows the probability density functions. 
Unsurprisingly, the Fisher-Tippett kernel has fatter tails and therefore higher means 
and medians than the Gauss kernel. The modes are about the same. Using the Gauss 
kernel with the sample coefficient of variation rather than the sample standard deviation 
has mixed effects. The estimates near zero get higher weight, and this pulls the mode 
and median down. However, the high estimates are spread thinly over a wide range, and 
this implies fatter tails and a higher mean. 
Splitting the sample by discount rate used has the expected effect: A higher discount 
rate implies a lower estimate of the SCC and a thinner tail. Table 1 also shows that 
estimates in the peer reviewed literature are lower and less uncertain than estimates in 
the gray literature. This confirms the findings of Tol (2005). 
Splitting the sample by publication date, shows that the estimates of the SCC 
published before AR2 (Pearce et al. 1995) were larger than the estimates published 
between AR2 and AR3 (Smith et al. 2001), which in turn were larger that the estimates 
published since. Note that these differences are not statistically significant if one 
considers the means and standard deviation. However, the kernel distribution clearly 
shifts to the left. Therefore, AR4 (Schneider et al. 2007) were incorrect to conclude that  
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Figure 1: The Kernel Estimate of the Probability Density Function of  
the Social Cost of Carbona  
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aTop left: alternative distributional assumptions; top right: sample split according to pure 
rate of time preference; bottom left: sample split according to review; bottom right: sample 
split according to age of study. The Fisher-Tippett distribution is used throughout (except 
top left). 
the economic estimates of the impact of climate change have increased since 2001. In 
their words (p. 781): “There is some evidence that initial new market benefits from 
climate change will peak at a lower magnitude and sooner than was assumed for the 
TAR, and it is likely that there will be higher damages for larger magnitudes of global 
mean temperature increases than was estimated in the TAR.” It is unclear how 
Schneider et al. (2007) reached this conclusion, but it is not supported by the data 
presented here. Then again, impacts of the economic impacts of climate change 
necessarily lag behind the latest insights from natural scientists, which indeed justify 
some increase in the alarm about climate change. Perhaps Schneider et al. (2007) 
speculate on the results of future research in economics, a clear violation of the IPCC 
mandate. 
Tol (2005) also finds a downward trend in the estimates of the social cost of carbon. 
However, the mean estimates of the SCC are higher in this paper than in Tol (2005). 
This is due to the different treatment of uncertainty. The Gauss/Coefficient of Variation 
estimates in this paper are methodologically closest to the method used in Tol (2005), 
and the results are similar. The Gauss/Standard Deviation and particularly the Fisher-
Tippett/Standard Deviation estimates put more emphasis on the uncertainty, which leads 
to higher numbers. 
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Table 2 splits the sample by author. Three authors have contributed a range of 
papers on the social cost of carbon: Chris Hope, William Nordhaus, and Richard Tol. 
Separate results are shown for these three and for all other authors. Table 2 reveals no 
significant differences—the uncertainties are simply too large—but Nordhaus’ estimates 
are lowest, followed by Hope, Tol, and other authors. It is noteworthy that repeat 
contributors to the literature on the social cost of carbon are less pessimistic about the 
impact of climate change. 
The SCC estimate by Stern et al. (2006) is almost an outlier in the entire sample 
(excluding, of course, the Stern estimate itself). Depending on the kernel density, the 
Stern estimate lies between the 90th and the 94th percentile. Compared to the peer-
reviewed literature, the Stern estimate lies beyond the 95th percentile—that is, it is an 
outlier. The Stern estimate fits in better with estimates that use a low discount rate and 
were not peer-reviewed—characteristics of the Stern Review—but even in comparison 
to those studies, Stern et al. (2006) are on the high side. Interestingly, the estimate by 
Stern et al. (2006) is based on Hope’s PAGE model but is an outlier compared to earlier 
estimates with that model (see Table 2). The Stern estimate also fits in better with the  
Table 2: Selected Characteristicsa of the Joint Probability Density of the Social Cost of 
Carbon for the Whole Sample (all) and Author-Based Subsamplesb 
 All (211) Hope (48) Nordhaus (8) Tol (112) Other (53) 
Fisher-Tippett, sample standard deviation 
Mode 35 22 8 34 64 
Mean 127 42 28 68 207 
St.Dev. 243 60 42 86 337 
Median 74 31 17 53 120 
90% 267 84 65 157 511 
95% 453 113 145 205 797 
99% 1,655 435 176 394 1,762 
Gauss, sample standard deviation 
Mode 33 20 8 29 55 
Mean 88 29 19 47 143 
St.Dev. 243 60 42 86 337 
Median 47 22 11 37 77 
90% 213 68 49 130 395 
95% 371 88 138 174 730 
99% 1,623 423 168 366 1,723 
Gauss, sample coefficient of variation 
Mode 0 4 6 0 1 
Mean 102 32 20 49 156 
St.Dev. 351 119 86 137 438 
Median 15 15 7 12 27 
90% 304 82 43 161 455 
95% 596 116 103 247 952 
99% 2,025 440 459 593 2,378 
aMode, mean, standard deviation, median, 90-percentile, 95-percentile, 99-percentile. bThe 
numbers in brackets are the number of estimates. 
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older studies. This is no surprise, as the PAGE model (e.g., Hope 2006) is updated only 
with great delay—that is, after the literature reviews by the IPCC (Pearce et al. 2005; 
Smith et al. 2001). It does fly in the face, though, of the assertion by Stern et al. (2006) 
to have used the latest research. Even though the Stern et al. (2006) estimate is almost 
an outlier, this of course does not mean that it is wrong. However, the most positive 
verdict in the economic literature on the Stern Review is that it was right for the wrong 
reasons (Arrow 2007; Weitzman 2007a). 
4 Catastrophic Liability 
Weitzman (2007b) argues that the uncertainty about climate change may be so profound 
that the expected welfare loss is unbounded. See also Tol (2003) and Tol and Yohe 
(2007b). Figure 2 has a different take on this. It plots the cumulative kernel density 
estimate (Fisher-Tippett), and the fraction of the world population for whom the 
“liability of climate change” (i.e., the SCC times their emissions) exceeds their per 
capita income. See Tol and Verheyen (2004) for a discussion on liability and impacts of 
climate change. Figure 2 is based on three rather strong assumptions. Firstly, it assumes 
that people are liable for their greenhouse gas emissions and compensate the victims. 
Secondly, Figure 2 only considers the compensation paid but disregards the 
compensation received.  Thirdly,  it assumes that liability for emissions does not induce  
Figure 2: The Cumulative Kernel Density Function of the Social Cost of Carbon 
(in $/tC) and the Fraction of the World Population for Whom the Total “Carbon Tax” 
Exceeds Incomea  
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aPopulation, per capita income, and per capita CO2 emissions are for year 2002 from 
http://earthtrends.wri.org. 
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greenhouse gas emission reduction. Although clearly unrealistic, Figure 2 does provide 
insight into the scale of the climate problem. 
For a rising SCC, first the countries with high emission intensity (CO2 emissions per 
gross domestic product) would be “bankrupted”—that is, the annual carbon liability (if 
paid without reducing emissions) would exceed the annual income for the average 
person. Using 2002 data, the Ukraine would be the first country to which this would 
happen.6 A carbon liability of $418/tC would be too much.7 The probability that the 
SCC exceeds $418/tC varies between 5% and 7%. See Table 3. This is a high 
probability for an “infinite” loss—but such a high liability would trigger emission 
reduction, other countries may come to the assistance of the Ukraine, and it is unlikely 
to impose such a high tax in the first place. 
Table 3 also shows the SCCs that would “bankrupt” 1%, 5%, and 10% of the world 
population, and the associated probabilities. Obviously, the SCCs are higher, and the 
probabilities smaller—but there is still a probability of 1–2% that the SCC is larger than 
$1385/tC, which would “bankrupt” more than 10% of the world population. For all 
three kernel distributions, there is a positive probability that more than 60% of the world 
population is “bankrupted”. The expected fraction of the world population that goes 
“bankrupt” lies between 0.6% and 1.1%. 
A comparison of Table 3 and Table 1 reveals the probability of “bankruptcy” is 
dominated by the discount rate, the gray literature, and older studies. Newer studies 
published in peer-reviewed journals based on high discount rates estimate only a very 
small chance of a carbon liability in excess of annual income. 
Finally, Table 3 shows the risk premium of the SCC for the average person on Earth. 
The risk premia vary between 15% and 27%—for the average. For over 60% of the 
world population, the risk premium is infinite. This confirms Weitzman’s (2007b) claim 
that climate policy analysis is dominated by the tails of the distribution. It also 
highlights that climate is an equity problem. 
The results in Figure 2 and Table 3 omit emission reduction, but a simple scaling of 
the results gives a crude estimate of the effect of emission reduction. According to 
Table 3, a carbon liability of $440/tC would equal 100% of income for 1% of the world 
population. If a liability of $880/tC would reduce emissions by 50%, then $880/tC 
would equal 100% of income for 1% of the world population. However, in the short-
term, emission reductions will be far less than 50%. 
The results change when we recast the numbers as a “carbon tax” rather than a 
“carbon liability”. The price of carbon is the same, but the revenue flows to the 
government and is presumably recycled as lower taxes and higher benefits. A carbon tax 
of $440/tC (or $880/tC with a 50% emission reduction) would imply that 1% of the 
world population would pay 100% of its income in carbon taxes, and would live of 
government benefits. 
 
 
 
_________________________ 
6 Note that although richer people within a country tend to emit more greenhouse gases than do poorer 
people, but that the emissions distribution typically is less skewed than the income distribution. This 
implies that the poor in the Ukraine would be hit harder by a carbon liability than would the rich. 
7 Note that a country like the Ukraine is not particularly vulnerable to climate change, and would 
therefore receive less compensation than it would pay. 
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Table 3: The Social Cost of Carbon for Which 1% / 5% / 10% of the World Population 
Would Be “Bankrupted by a Carbon Tax”, and their Exceedance Probability According 
to Three Alternative Kernel Densitiesab 
 SCC Probability 
 $/tC FT G (SD) G (Cov) 
1st  418  5.4%  4.7%  7.3% 
1%  440  5.1%  4.5%  6.9% 
5%  1,166  1.5%  1.4%  2.4% 
10%  1,385  1.4%  1.4%  2.0% 
Exp.   0.7%  0.6%  1.1% 
RP   15%  18%  27% 
aFisher-Tippett with sample standard deviation; Gauss with sample standard deviation; 
Gauss with sample coefficient of variation. bAlso shown are the SCC that triggers the first 
bankruptcy and its exceedance probabilities; the expected fraction of the population that 
faces “bankruptcy” (exp); and the risk premium (RP). 
5 Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper presents an update of an earlier meta-analysis (Tol 2005) of the social cost of 
carbon. Using more data and more advanced statistical analysis, this paper confirms the 
findings of Tol (2005) that estimates of the social cost of carbon are driven to a large 
extent by the choice of the discount rate and equity weights; and that the more 
pessimistic estimates have not been subject to peer review. This paper also offers four 
new results. Firstly, there is a downward trend in the estimates of the social cost of 
carbon—even if the IPCC (Schneider et al. 2007) would like to believe the opposite. 
Secondly, the Stern Review (Stern et al. 2006) is an outlier—and its impact estimates 
are pessimistic even when compared to other studies in the gray literature and other 
estimates that use low discount rates. Thirdly, the uncertainty about the social cost of 
carbon is so large that the tails of the distribution may dominate the conclusions 
(Weitzman 2007b)—even though many of the high estimates have not been peer-
reviewed and use unacceptably low discount rates. Fourthly, if everyone were to pay a 
carbon price equal to the social cost of carbon (but not reduce emissions much, as they 
cannot in the short-term), there is a fair chance that annual taxes would exceed annual 
income for many people. If the carbon price is a liability, this would imply bankruptcy. 
If the carbon price is a tax, this would imply complete collectivisation of the economy. 
There are three implications. Firstly, greenhouse gas emission reduction today is 
justified. Even the most conservative assumption lead to positive estimates of the social 
cost of carbon (cf. Table 1) and the Pigou tax is thus greater than zero. Yohe et al. 
(2007) argue that there is reason to reduce greenhouse gas emissions further than 
recommended by cost-benefit analysis. The median of the Fisher-Tippett kernel density 
for peer-reviewed estimates with a 3% pure rate of time preference and without equity 
weights, is $20/tC. This compares to a price of carbon permits of $160/tC in the 
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European Union,8 and a zero price in most of the rest of the world. The case for 
intensification of climate policy outside the EU can be made with conservative 
assumptions. One does not have to rely on speculation as in Schneider et al. (2007) or 
dodgy analysis as in Stern et al. (2006). At the same time, current EU climate policy 
seems to fail the cost-benefit test unless one puts a heavy emphasis on risk and uses a 
very low discount rate (cf. Tol, 2007, for a more detailed discussion). Secondly, the 
uncertainty is so large that a considerable risk premium is warranted. With the 
conservative assumptions above, the mean equals $23/tC and the certainty-equivalent 
$25/tC. More importantly, there is a 1% probability that the social cost of carbon is 
greater than $78/tC. This number rapidly increases if we use a lower discount rate—as 
may well be appropriate for a problem with such a long time horizon—and if we allow 
for the possibility that there is some truth in the scare-mongering of the gray literature. 
Thirdly, more research is needed into the economic impacts of climate change—to 
eliminate that part of the uncertainty that is due to lack of study, and to separate the 
truly scary impacts from the scare-mongering. Papers often conclude with a call for 
more research, and often this is a call for funding for the authors or a justification for 
further papers by the authors. In this case, however, quality research by newcomers in 
the field would be particularly welcome. 
_________________________ 
8 June 28, 2008; http://www.eex.de/en; http://www.oanda.com/ 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Estimates of the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC), and Characteristics  
of the Study (PR: peer-reviewed; IE: independent estimate; ME: correct  
estimation method; DM: dynamic model of vulnerability; SC: realistic scenario;  
CDR: consumption discount rate; PRTP: pure rate of time preference;  
EW: equity-weighted) 
Author Year Weight SCC PR IE ME DM SC CDR PRTP EW 
Nordhaus 1982 1.000 146.7 1 1 0 0 0 NA 1.0 0 
Ayres & Walter 1991 1.000 119.0 1 1 0 0 0 3.0 1.0 0 
Nordhaus 1991 1.000 26.8 1 1 0 0 0 3.0 1.0 0 
Haradan 1992 1.000 7.3 1 1 0 0 0 4.0 2.0 0 
Cline 1992 1.000 64.9 0 1 1 0 1 NA NA 0 
Hoymeyer & Gaertner 1992 1.000 1,666.7 0 1 0 0 1 0.0 –2.0 0 
Haradan 1993 0.250 1.9 1 0 0 0 0 4.0 2.0 0 
 1993 0.500 3.0 1 0 0 0 0 4.0 2.0 0 
 1993 0.250 8.8 1 0 0 0 0 4.0 2.0 0 
Nordhaus 1993 1.000 5.0 1 0 1 0 1 5.0 3.0 0 
Peck & Teisberg 1993 1.000 10.0 1 0 1 0 1 5.0 3.0 0 
Reilly & Richards 1993 0.500 14.3 1 0 1 0 0 5.0 3.0 0 
 1993 0.500 21.2 1 0 1 0 0 5.0 3.0 0 
Fankhauser 1994 1.000 20.3 1 1 1 0 1 NA NA 0 
Nordhaus 1994 1.000 5.3 0 1 1 0 1 5.0 3.0 0 
Azar 1994 0.250 50.0 1 0 0 0 0 NA 0.0 0 
 1994 0.500 200.0 1 0 0 0 0 NA 0.0 0 
 1994 0.250 500.0 1 0 0 0 0 NA 0.0 0 
Maddison 1995 1.000 16.5 1 0 1 0 1 5.0 3.0 0 
Schauer 1995 0.500 8.3 1 1 1 0 1 4.9 2.3 0 
 1995 0.500 112.5 1 1 1 0 1 4.9 2.3 0 
Plambeck & Hope 1996 0.300 3.0 1 1 1 0 1 5.0 3.0 0 
 1996 0.100 8.0 1 1 1 0 1 5.0 3.0 0 
 1996 0.100 8.0 1 1 1 0 1 5.0 3.0 0 
 1996 0.300 21.0 1 1 1 0 1 5.0 3.0 0 
 1996 0.100 46.0 1 1 1 0 1 4.0 2.0 0 
 1996 0.100 440.0 1 1 1 0 1 2.0 0.0 0 
Azar & Sterner 1996 0.044 85.0 1 0 1 0 1 2.0 0.0 0 
 1996 0.089 200.0 1 0 1 0 1 2.0 0.0 0 
 1996 0.033 75.0 1 0 1 0 1 2.1 0.1 0 
 1996 0.067 140.0 1 0 1 0 1 2.1 0.1 0 
 1996 0.022 32.0 1 0 1 0 1 3.0 1.0 0 
 1996 0.044 33.0 1 0 1 0 1 3.0 1.0 0 
 1996 0.011 13.0 1 0 1 0 1 5.0 3.0 0 
 1996 0.022 13.0 1 0 1 0 1 5.0 3.0 0 
 1996 0.089 260.0 1 0 1 0 1 2.0 0.0 1 
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Author Year Weight SCC PR IE ME DM SC CDR PRTP EW 
 1996 0.178 590.0 1 0 1 0 1 2.0 0.0 1 
 1996 0.067 230.0 1 0 1 0 1 2.1 0.1 1 
 1996 0.133 410.0 1 0 1 0 1 2.1 0.1 1 
 1996 0.044 95.0 1 0 1 0 1 3.0 1.0 1 
 1996 0.089 98.0 1 0 1 0 1 3.0 1.0 1 
 1996 0.022 39.0 1 0 1 0 1 5.0 3.0 1 
 1996 0.044 39.0 1 0 1 0 1 5.0 3.0 1 
Downing et al. 1996 0.500 53.5 0 1 0 1 1 0.0 –2.0 0 
 1996 0.500 18.3 0 1 0 1 1 0.0 –2.0 0 
Hohmeyer 1996 1.000 800.0 0 0 0 0 1 0.0 –2.0 0 
Hope & Maul 1996 0.100 7.0 1 1 1 0 0 4.0 2.0 0 
 1996 1.000 24.0 1 1 1 0 0 4.0 2.0 0 
 1996 0.800 5.0 1 1 1 0 1 4.0 2.0 0 
 1996 0.100 29.0 1 1 1 0 0 4.0 2.0 0 
Nordhaus & Yang 1996 1.000 6.2 1 1 1 0 1 5.0 3.0 0 
Nordhaus & Popp 1997 0.900 11.6 1 0 1 0 1 5.0 3.0 0 
 1997 0.100 6.3 1 0 1 0 1 5.0 3.0 0 
Cline 1997 1.000 88.0 0 1 1 0 1 NA NA 0 
Eyre et al. 1999 0.500 170.0 0 0 1 1 1 1.0 –1.0 1 
 1999 0.500 70.0 0 0 1 1 1 3.0 1.0 1 
 1999 0.500 160.0 0 0 1 1 1 1.0 –1.0 1 
 1999 0.500 74.0 0 0 1 1 1 3.0 1.0 1 
Tol 1999 0.250 60.0 1 1 1 1 1 3.0 1.0 1 
 1999 0.050 62.0 1 1 1 1 1 3.0 1.0 1 
 1999 0.050 23.0 1 1 1 1 1 3.0 1.0 0 
 1999 0.050 66.0 1 1 1 1 1 3.0 1.0 1 
 1999 0.050 65.0 1 1 1 1 1 3.0 1.0 1 
 1999 0.050 56.0 1 1 1 1 1 3.0 1.0 1 
 1999 0.050 317.0 1 1 1 1 1 0.0 –2.0 1 
 1999 0.010 243.0 1 1 1 1 1 0.0 –2.0 1 
 1999 0.010 142.0 1 1 1 1 1 0.0 –2.0 0 
 1999 0.010 360.0 1 1 1 1 1 0.0 –2.0 1 
 1999 0.010 348.0 1 1 1 1 1 0.0 –2.0 1 
 1999 0.010 288.0 1 1 1 1 1 0.0 –2.0 1 
 1999 0.050 171.0 1 1 1 1 1 1.0 –1.0 1 
 1999 0.010 172.0 1 1 1 1 1 1.0 –1.0 1 
 1999 0.010 73.0 1 1 1 1 1 1.0 –1.0 0 
 1999 0.010 192.0 1 1 1 1 1 1.0 –1.0 1 
 1999 0.010 187.0 1 1 1 1 1 1.0 –1.0 1 
 1999 0.010 156.0 1 1 1 1 1 1.0 –1.0 1 
 1999 0.100 26.0 1 1 1 1 1 5.0 3.0 1 
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Author Year Weight SCC PR IE ME DM SC CDR PRTP EW 
 1999 0.020 26.0 1 1 1 1 1 5.0 3.0 1 
 1999 0.020 9.0 1 1 1 1 1 5.0 3.0 0 
 1999 0.020 28.0 1 1 1 1 1 5.0 3.0 1 
 1999 0.020 28.0 1 1 1 1 1 5.0 3.0 1 
 1999 0.020 25.0 1 1 1 1 1 5.0 3.0 1 
 1999 0.050 6.0 1 1 1 1 1 10.0 8.0 1 
 1999 0.010 6.0 1 1 1 1 1 10.0 8.0 1 
 1999 0.010 2.0 1 1 1 1 1 10.0 8.0 0 
 1999 0.010 6.0 1 1 1 1 1 10.0 8.0 1 
 1999 0.010 6.0 1 1 1 1 1 10.0 8.0 1 
 1999 0.010 6.0 1 1 1 1 1 10.0 8.0 1 
Roughgarden & Schneider 1999 1.000 40.4 1 1 1 0 1 5.0 3.0 0 
Nordhaus & Boyer 2000 1.000 5.9 0 1 1 0 1 NA NA 0 
Tol & Downing 2000 0.100 26.1 0 0 1 1 1 3.0 1.0 1 
 2000 0.100 3.5 0 0 1 1 1 3.0 1.0 0 
 2000 1.000 45.8 0 0 1 1 1 3.0 1.0 1 
 2000 0.800 5.1 0 0 1 1 1 3.0 1.0 0 
Clarkson & Deyes 2002 1.000 101.5 0 0 1 0 1 3.0 1.0 1 
Tol  2002 0.083 19.9 0 1 1 1 1 2.0 0.0 0 
 2002 0.167 16.1 0 1 1 1 1 2.0 0.0 1 
 2002 0.167 3.8 0 1 1 1 1 3.0 1.0 0 
 2002 0.333 6.6 0 1 1 1 1 3.0 1.0 1 
 2002 0.083 –6.6 0 1 1 1 1 5.0 3.0 0 
 2002 0.167 –0.5 0 1 1 1 1 5.0 3.0 1 
Newell & Pizer 2003 0.100 5.7 1 0 1 0 1 4.0 2.0 0 
 2003 0.200 10.4 1 0 1 0 1 NA 2.0 0 
 2003 0.200 6.5 1 0 1 0 1 NA 2.0 0 
 2003 0.050 21.7 1 0 1 0 1 2.0 0.0 0 
 2003 0.100 33.8 1 0 1 0 1 NA 0.0 0 
 2003 0.100 23.3 1 0 1 0 1 NA 0.0 0 
 2003 0.050 1.5 1 0 1 0 1 7.0 5.0 0 
 2003 0.100 2.9 1 0 1 0 1 NA 5.0 0 
 2003 0.100 1.8 1 0 1 0 1 NA 5.0 0 
Pearce 2003 1.000 23.5 1 0 1 0 1 3.0 1.0 1 
Uzawa 2003 1.000 160.7 0 1 0 0 0 NA NA NA 
Mendelsohn 2003 1.000 1.5 0 1 0 0 0 5.0 3.0 0 
Hope 2003 1.000 19.0 0 0 1 0 1 NA 3.0 0 
Link & Tol 2004 0.165 79.0 1 1 1 1 1 NA 0.0 0 
 2004 0.165 170.0 1 1 1 1 1 NA 0.0 1 
 2004 0.165 25.2 1 1 1 1 1 NA 1.0 0 
 2004 0.165 94.1 1 1 1 1 1 NA 1.0 1 
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Table A1 continued 
Author Year Weight SCC PR IE ME DM SC CDR PRTP EW 
 2004 0.165 5.1 1 1 1 1 1 NA 3.0 0 
 2004 0.165 45.1 1 1 1 1 1 NA 3.0 1 
 2004 0.002 75.6 1 1 1 1 1 NA 0.0 0 
 2004 0.002 167.8 1 1 1 1 1 NA 0.0 1 
 2004 0.002 24.4 1 1 1 1 1 NA 1.0 0 
 2004 0.002 93.6 1 1 1 1 1 NA 1.0 1 
 2004 0.002 5.0 1 1 1 1 1 NA 3.0 0 
 2004 0.002 45.0 1 1 1 1 1 NA 3.0 1 
Hohmeyer 2004 0.500 32.0 0 0 1 0 1 NA 1.0 0 
 2004 0.500 590.0 0 0 1 0 1 NA 0.0 1 
Cline 2004 0.900 128.0 0 0 1 0 1 NA NA 0 
 2004 0.050 450.0 0 0 1 0 1 NA NA 0 
 2004 0.050 10.0 0 0 1 0 1 NA NA 0 
Manne 2004 0.050 300.0 0 0 1 0 1 NA NA 0 
 2004 0.950 12.0 0 0 1 0 1 NA NA 0 
Hope 2005 1.000 21.0 0 1 1 0 1 NA 3.0 0 
Ceronsky et al. 2005 0.238 58.0 0 0 1 1 1 NA 0.0 0 
 2005 0.238 11.0 0 0 1 1 1 NA 1.0 0 
 2005 0.238 –2.3 0 0 1 1 1 NA 3.0 0 
 2005 0.238 18.0 0 0 1 1 1 NA NA 0 
 2005 0.001 54.0 0 0 1 1 1 NA 0.0 0 
 2005 0.001 11.0 0 0 1 1 1 NA 1.0 0 
 2005 0.001 –2.5 0 0 1 1 1 NA 3.0 0 
 2005 0.001 17.0 0 0 1 1 1 NA NA 0 
 2005 0.001 54.0 0 0 1 1 1 NA 0.0 0 
 2005 0.001 13.0 0 0 1 1 1 NA 1.0 0 
 2005 0.001 –0.1 0 0 1 1 1 NA 3.0 0 
 2005 0.001 20.0 0 0 1 1 1 NA NA 0 
 2005 0.001 54.0 0 0 1 1 1 NA 0.0 0 
 2005 0.001 10.0 0 0 1 1 1 NA 1.0 0 
 2005 0.001 –2.5 0 0 1 1 1 NA 3.0 0 
 2005 0.001 17.0 0 0 1 1 1 NA NA 0 
 2005 0.001 55.0 0 0 1 1 1 NA 0.0 0 
 2005 0.001 11.0 0 0 1 1 1 NA 1.0 0 
 2005 0.001 –2.5 0 0 1 1 1 NA 3.0 0 
 2005 0.001 18.0 0 0 1 1 1 NA NA 0 
 2005 0.001 58.0 0 0 1 1 1 NA 0.0 0 
 2005 0.001 12.0 0 0 1 1 1 NA 1.0 0 
 2005 0.001 –2.3 0 0 1 1 1 NA 3.0 0 
 2005 0.001 18.0 0 0 1 1 1 NA NA 0 
 2005 0.001 73.0 0 0 1 1 1 NA 0.0 0 
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Author Year Weight SCC PR IE ME DM SC CDR PRTP EW 
 2005 0.001 16.0 0 0 1 1 1 NA 1.0 0 
 2005 0.001 –1.6 0 0 1 1 1 NA 3.0 0 
 2005 0.001 24.0 0 0 1 1 1 NA NA 0 
 2005 0.001 94.0 0 0 1 1 1 NA 0.0 0 
 2005 0.001 21.0 0 0 1 1 1 NA 1.0 0 
 2005 0.001 –0.7 0 0 1 1 1 NA 3.0 0 
 2005 0.001 30.0 0 0 1 1 1 NA NA 0 
 2005 0.001 330.0 0 0 1 1 1 NA 0.0 0 
 2005 0.001 89.0 0 0 1 1 1 NA 1.0 0 
 2005 0.001 17.0 0 0 1 1 1 NA 3.0 0 
 2005 0.001 100.0 0 0 1 1 1 NA NA 0 
 2005 0.001 1,500.0 0 0 1 1 1 NA 0.0 0 
 2005 0.001 360.0 0 0 1 1 1 NA 1.0 0 
 2005 0.001 75.0 0 0 1 1 1 NA 3.0 0 
 2005 0.001 270.0 0 0 1 1 1 NA NA 0 
 2005 0.001 2,400.0 0 0 1 1 1 NA 0.0 0 
 2005 0.001 580.0 0 0 1 1 1 NA 1.0 0 
 2005 0.001 120.0 0 0 1 1 1 NA 3.0 0 
 2005 0.001 360.0 0 0 1 1 1 NA NA 0 
Hope 2005 0.167 43.0 0 0 1 0 1 NA 3.0 1 
 2005 0.167 35.0 0 0 1 0 1 NA 3.0 1 
 2005 0.167 31.0 0 0 1 0 1 NA 3.0 0 
 2005 0.167 46.0 0 0 1 0 1 NA 3.0 1 
 2005 0.167 37.0 0 0 1 0 1 NA 3.0 1 
 2005 0.167 32.0 0 0 1 0 1 NA 3.0 0 
Downing et al. 2005 1.000 50.8 0 0 0 0 0 NA NA 1 
Guo et al. 2006 0.016 58.0 1 0 1 1 1 NA 0.0 0 
 2006 0.016 11.0 1 0 1 1 1 NA 1.0 0 
 2006 0.016 –2.3 1 0 1 1 1 NA 3.0 0 
 2006 0.143 18.0 1 0 1 1 1 NA NA 0 
 2006 0.008 6.6 1 0 1 1 1 3.5  0 
 2006 0.143 88.0 1 0 1 1 1 NA NA 0 
 2006 0.008 2.1 1 0 1 1 1 4.0  0 
 2006 0.214 88.0 1 0 1 1 1 NA NA 0 
 2006 0.008 2.1 1 0 1 1 1 4.0  0 
 2006 0.036 185.0 1 0 1 1 1 NA 0.0 0 
 2006 0.036 29.0 1 0 1 1 1 NA 1.0 0 
 2006 0.036 –1.3 1 0 1 1 1 NA 3.0 0 
 2006 0.036 85.0 1 0 1 1 1 NA 0.0 0 
 2006 0.036 15.0 1 0 1 1 1 NA 1.0 0 
 2006 0.036 –2.1 1 0 1 1 1 NA 3.0 0 
 2006 0.214 35.0 1 0 1 1 1 NA NA 0 
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Table A1 continued 
Author Year Weight SCC PR IE ME DM SC CDR PRTP EW 
Wahba & Hope 2006 0.200 19.0 1 0 1 0 1 NA 3.0 0 
 2006 0.200 14.0 1 0 1 0 1 NA 3.0 0 
 2006 0.100 47.0 1 0 1 0 1 NA 2.0 0 
 2006 0.100 145.0 1 0 1 0 1 NA 1.0 0 
 2006 0.100 30.0 1 0 1 0 1 NA 2.0 0 
 2006 0.100 91.0 1 0 1 0 1 NA 1.0 0 
 2006 0.100 29.0 1 0 1 0 1 NA 3.0 0 
 2006 0.100 21.0 1 0 1 0 1 NA 3.0 0 
Hope 2006 1.000 19.0 1 0 1 0 1 NA 3.0 0 
Stern et al. 2006 1.000 314.0 0 0 1 0 1 NA 0.0 1 
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